Children of One People

Proposed organic law — not enacted

Proposed Organic Electoral Law

Status: revision proposal; not enacted law. Original source: Article 13 Sections 3–4; approved candidate-support requirements. Disposition: relocated and classified under the approved revision instructions. Intended legal type: protected organic law. Relocation approved: yes. Substance: provisional algorithm; voter-community restrictions superseded; implementation choices reserved.

Proposed function

Implement universal access to all three district contests, independent candidate qualification, and confidential nontraceable community-support authentication under Articles 4 and 13. Verify only endorsement eligibility, district, and uniqueness; separate identity verification from candidate endorsement and ballot records; publish necessary aggregate totals only. No public political list or permanent voter-caucus or identity-community registry may be created.

Preserved algorithm, provisionally relocated

The source paragraph below is historical text preserved for technical adaptation. Its reference to “their caucus ballot” is superseded by every voter's right to all three ballots; its apparent requirement to rank all candidates is superseded by optional separate rankings and blank contests.

  1. Voting within each caucus district ballot shall be conducted by the Ranked Pairs method. Each voter shall rank all candidates on their caucus ballot by preference, expressing no preference between any candidates they choose to leave unranked. The winner shall be determined as follows:

    • For every pair of candidates, the number of voters who ranked one candidate above the other shall be tallied. This produces a margin of victory for the preferred candidate in that pair.
    • All pairwise results shall be sorted in descending order by margin of victory, from largest to smallest.
    • Beginning with the largest margin, each pairwise result shall be provisionally locked in, in descending order, unless locking it in would create a cycle with results already locked in — meaning a sequence of locked-in results that would require a candidate to be preferred to themselves through a chain of other candidates. Any pairwise result that would create such a cycle shall be permanently skipped and shall not be locked in.
    • Once all pairwise results have been either locked in or skipped, the candidate who is preferred over every other candidate according to the locked-in results shall be declared elected.
    • Where two or more pairwise results carry an identical margin of victory, the result with the greater total number of votes for the preferred candidate in that pairing shall be locked in first. Where this does not resolve the tie, the tied results shall be locked in in the order published in advance by the Electoral Commission prior to the election, established by a non-discretionary formula fixed in law.

Delegated implementation — values pending legislation

Unranked-candidate treatment, a final unresolved-winner rule, the preannounced nondiscretionary tie formula, support quantities, endorsement-eligibility and uniqueness scope, privacy-preserving authentication, audit and deletion protocols, candidate-change timing, need implementation choices under the protected Organic Electoral Law. The source algorithm is not claimed to resolve every possible tie. No implementation may recreate a voter identity registry. Coordinated nomination abuse requires evidence, reasons, fair process, and judicial review; similarity of political views alone is insufficient.

Approved constitutional controls

Enactment, amendment, and repeal require a majority of the authorized membership of each caucus under Article 20. Vacancies, absences, abstentions, and disqualifications do not lower the threshold. The law remains subordinate, cannot diminish guarantees, silently amend the Constitution, or evade higher thresholds, and is subject to Constitutional Court review when challenged. This proposal is not enacted by its constitutional designation.

The law shall implement the ten-percent nationwide constitutional petition, objective-legal-effect two-year resubmission rule, expedited review, and majority-of-valid-votes amendment referendum without a participation floor or communal voter/signature lists. Verification, accessible procedures, notice, audit, and scheduling details remain to be drafted; amendment referenda occur sixty to one hundred twenty days after certification of the second approval, on exactly the same text; a material change cancels scheduling and restarts six-month review and two approvals at least ninety days apart. The separate Civil Service Charter petition threshold is five percent nationwide, with no communal classification or community-specific published totals; it initiates review without lowering approval thresholds. Reduction notice procedures must preserve successive regular enumerations, enhanced public review, each-caucus majority approval, prior Court certification, future-election application, and pending-proceeding protection. No numerical notice period is selected.

Electoral Commission vacancy and removal boundary

Article 13 now expressly requires removal of an Electoral and Boundary Commission member to use the same component-specific confirmation requirement and overall Assembly majority applicable to that member's appointment. This organic law may establish neutral procedures, evidence, timing, vacancy administration, initial staggering, and replacement for the remainder of a term, but may not lower the permanent appointment or removal thresholds.

First-EBC transition boundary

Stage One requires an operational Electoral and Boundary Commission before the first Assembly exists, while the ordinary Article 13 permanent appointment path requires Assembly confirmation. The first-EBC selection mechanism therefore remains a founding-authority question under ../rfc/RFC-009-founding-ratification-protocol-first-constitutional-authority.md and the transition interaction audit ../reviews/V01-05-transition-handoff-first-institutions.md.

This organic law may implement the first election only after a lawful founding instrument establishes the first EBC. It may not invent the first Commission's democratic authority, lower the permanent Article 13 thresholds, or preserve a temporary founding appointment route after the ordinary constitutional pathway becomes available.